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Abstract: This study examines whether the degree of spillovers from foreign direct investment is affected 
by the foreign ownership share in investment projects.  The analysis, based on an unbalanced panel of 
Romanian firms during 1998-2000, produces evidence consistent with positive intra-sectoral spillovers 
resulting from fully-owned foreign affiliates but not from projects with joint domestic and foreign 
ownership. This finding is in line with the literature suggesting that foreign investors tend to put more 
resources into technology transfer to their wholly-owned projects than to those owned partially. Further, 
the data indicate that the presence of partially foreign-owned projects is correlated with higher 
productivity of domestic firms in upstream industries suggesting that domestic suppliers benefit from 
contacts with multinational customers.  The opposite is true, however, in the case of fully-owned foreign 
affiliates which appear to have a negative effect on domestic firms in upstream industries. These results 
are consistent with the observation that foreign investors entering a host country through greenfield 
projects are less likely to source locally than those engaged in joint ventures or partial acquisitions. They 
are also in line with the evidence suggesting that fully-owned foreign subsidiaries use newer or more 
sophisticated technologies than jointly owned investment projects and thus may have higher requirements 
vis-à-vis suppliers. 
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Many countries, including developing and transition economies, offer generous incentive 
packages to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) justifying their actions with the expected 
knowledge externalities to be generated by foreign affiliates operating in their economy.  While a 
lot of research effort has been put into looking for the evidence of such externalities,
1 little 
attention has been devoted to how the degree of foreign ownership affects knowledge spillovers 
from FDI.  A notable exception is a study by Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) who employ cross-
section data on Indonesian firms and find that there is no statistically significant difference 
between within-industry spillovers associated with minority- and majority-owned foreign 
projects. They also show that FDI, regardless of the degree of ownership, has a significant 
positive effect on the productivity of Indonesian firms operating in the same industry. In contrast, 
Dimelis and Louri (2001), using cross-sectional data on Greek manufacturing firms, demonstrate 
that while the labor productivity of domestic firms is enhanced by the presence of foreign 
affiliates in the same industry, spillovers stemming from minority-owned foreign establishments 
are larger than those from majority-owned ones. 
This paper investigates this question in more detail by extending the analysis to: (i) 
examine the difference between spillovers associated with fully- and partially-owned foreign 
investments in addition to comparing the impact of majority- and minority-owned foreign 
projects, and (ii) study both intra- (horizontal) as well as inter-industry (vertical) spillovers 
stemming from different types of foreign establishments.  Moreover, this study significantly 
improves upon the econometric techniques employed in the earlier literature by controlling for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity and taking into account the endogeneity of input selection with 
                                                 
1 Most of the existing firm level studies, including Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco, Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) on Venezuela, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech Republic, and Konings (2000) on Bulgaria, 
Poland and Romania cast doubt on the existence of horizontal (i.e., intra-industry) spillovers from FDI in developing 
countries. They either fail to find a significant effect or produce the evidence of the negative impact the presence of 
multinational corporations has on domestic firms in the same sector.  The few studies finding evidence of positive 
within-sector spillovers focus on developed countries (e.g., Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2002, on the UK). The 
exceptions are Konings (2001) and Kinoshita (2001) who found evidence of positive horizontal spillovers in R&D 
intensive sectors in Bulgaria and Poland, and the Czech Republic, respectively. The picture is more optimistic in the 
case of inter-industry, or vertical spillovers, taking place through contacts between domestic firms and their 
multinational customers operating in the same country.  Blalock (2001), Schoors and van der Tol (2001) and 
Smarzynska (2002) provide evidence consistent with the presence of positive FDI spillovers operating through this 
channel. 
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respect to productivity, which allows for consistent estimates of production function.
2  These 
improvements are possible since, unlike the existing literature which relies on cross-sectional 
information, this study employs a firm level panel dataset. 
The ownership structure of FDI may affect the presence of horizontal (or intra-industry) 
spillovers in two ways.  First, as Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) mentions, it is generally 
believed that participation of local capital in a foreign investment project reveals the 
multinational’s proprietary technology and thus facilitates spillovers.  This belief has led many 
governments in developing countries to introduce restrictions on the degree of foreign ownership 
allowed in firms operating in their country.
3  Second, fear of technology leakage, especially in 
countries with limited rule of law, may induce firms with most sophisticated technologies to shy 
away from shared ownership and instead choose to invest only in fully-owned subsidiaries.
4  As 
demonstrated by Ramacharandran (1993), foreign investors tend to devote more resources to 
technology transfer to their wholly-owned subsidiaries than to partially-owned affiliates. In the 
same manner, Mansfield and Romero (1980) point out that the transfer of technology is more 
rapid within wholly-owned networks of multinationals’ subsidiaries than to joint ventures or 
licensees.  Hence, partially-owned investment project may present a smaller potential for 
spillovers. The overall relationship between the share of foreign ownership and spillovers is a 
result of these two forces and its sign is, therefore, ambiguous. 
Turning to determinants of vertical (or inter-industry) spillovers, it has been argued that 
affiliates established through joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions are more likely to source 
their inputs locally than those taking form of greenfield projects (UNCTC 2001).  While the 
latter need to put significant efforts into developing linkages with local suppliers, the former can 
take advantages of the supplier relationships of the acquired firm or the local partner.  Empirical 
evidence to support this view has been found for Japanese investors (Belderbos et al. 2001) and 
for Swedish affiliates in Eastern and Central Europe (UNCTC 2000). On the other hand, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign investors acquiring local firms in transition countries 
                                                 
2 Griliches and Mairesse (1995) have argued that inputs should be considered endogenous since they are chosen by a 
firm based on its productivity, which is observed by the producer but not by the econometrician.  Not taking into 
account the endogeneity of input choices biases the estimated production function coefficients. Since the focus of 
this paper is on firm productivity, the consistency of the estimates is crucial for the analysis. 
3 For instance, in the 1980s restrictions on foreign ownership were present in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka (UNCTC, 1987). 
4 See Smarzynska and Wei (2000) and Javorcik and Saggi (2002).   4
tend to dramatically reduce the number of local suppliers.
5  While in our dataset we cannot 
distinguish between acquisitions, joint ventures and greenfield projects, we have detailed 
information on the foreign equity share.  To the extent that full foreign ownership is a proxy for 
greenfield projects and full acquisitions, we expect that fully-owned foreign affiliates will rely 
more on imported inputs, while investment projects with local capital will source more locally.
6  
Therefore, we anticipate larger spillovers to be associated with partially-owned foreign projects 
than with fully-owned foreign subsidiaries.  This effect may be reinforced by the fact that fully-
owned foreign affiliates may use newer or more sophisticated technologies than their partially-
owned counterparts and thus may have higher requirements vis-à-vis suppliers which only a 
handful of domestic firms, if any, would be able to meet. 
We examine the above hypotheses using data from the Amadeus database which includes 
information on 54,032 Romanian firms for the period 1998-2000.  In contrast to the findings of 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), our results suggest that the degree of foreign ownership matters 
for horizontal spillovers.  Moreover, it also affects the degree of vertical spillovers from FDI.  
When we estimate a regression similar to the cross-sectional one employed by Blomström and 
Sjöholm we confirm their result of no difference between spillovers associated with minority- 
and majority-owned foreign projects.  However, when we compare the effects of fully- and 
partially-owned foreign investments we find a significant difference between the two.  Only the 
fully-owned foreign investments are found to be associated with positive productivity spillovers 
within a sector. We also test for the difference in the effect of minority-owned, majority-but-not-
fully-owned and fully-owned projects. Interestingly enough, we find that positive spillovers are 
associated only with fully-owned foreign projects and that there is no statistically significant 
difference between spillovers stemming from the two other types of FDI.  
                                                 
5  One of the largest FDI projects in Romania, Renault’s purchase of an equity stake in Dacia, the local automobile 
maker, may serve as an example.  The initial transaction took place in 1999 with subsequent increases in Renault’s 
share in 2001and 2002.  After the acquisition, the French company promised to continue sourcing inputs from local 
suppliers provided they lived up to the expectations of the new owner.  This, however, does not seem to have been 
the case.  In 2002, eleven foreign suppliers of the French group were expected to start operating in Romania, thus 
replacing the Romanian producers from whom Dacia used to source (Ziarul Financiar (Financial Newspaper) April 
19, 2001). 
6  A recent survey of multinationals operating in Latvia provides support for this view as it shows that while 52 
percent of firms with joint domestic and foreign ownership had at least one local supplier of intermediate inputs, the 
same was true of only 9 percent of fully-owned foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, partially-owned foreign buyers were 
reported to offer more technical, managerial and financial assistance to their suppliers than fully-owned ones (FIAS 
2003).    
Further, the results of a study of the largest exporters in Hungary also indicate that foreign affiliates with larger 
share of foreign equity tend to purchase fewer inputs from Hungarian companies (Toth and Semjen 1999).   5
Next we improve upon the Blomström and Sjöholm’s methodology by controlling for  
unobserved firm characteristics and confirm that only the fully-owned foreign projects result in 
positive horizontal spillovers and that there are no significant effects associated with minority 
and majority-but-not-fully-owned foreign projects. Again the difference between spillovers 
associated with fully- and partially-owned foreign projects is statistically significant.   
Furthermore, we implement the Olley and Pakes (1996) correction for endogeneity of input 
selection and control for industry concentration and still find that the degree of foreign 
ownership in investment projects matters for the extent of intra-industry spillovers. 
Finally, we find a pattern of vertical spillovers that is consistent with our expectations.  
Our results suggest that positive externalities are associated with partially-owned foreign projects 
which were hypothesized to rely more heavily on local suppliers.  On the other hand, fully-
owned foreign subsidiaries are shown to have a negative effect on productivity of domestic firms 
in upstream sectors.  This negative effect may be due to the fact that foreign investors acquiring 
domestic enterprises may upgrade production facilities which results in demand for more 
complex, higher quality inputs and leads to severing existing relationships with local suppliers 
and greater reliance on imported inputs.  The subsequent decrease in demand for intermediates 
produced in Romania may prevent local producers from reaping the benefits of scale economies.
7  
 
This paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we discuss FDI inflows into 
Romania.  Then we present our data, estimation strategy and the empirical results.  The last 
section concludes. 
 
FDI in Romania  
  After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, Romania started its transformation 
to a market economy. During the first years following the regime change, the government took a 
cautious approach to transition.  Privatization in Romania lagged behind those in other Central 
East European countries and so did FDI inflows. The situation changed after 1997 when a mass-
                                                 
7  This finding is consistent with the case study discussed in the previous footnote and the anecdotal evidence from 
the Czech Republic indicating that multinationals upgrading or changing the nature of their production may switch 
from local to global sourcing and thus drop their suppliers in a host country (KPMG 2002).  This result is also in line 
with the theoretical predictions of Saggi (2002) who shows that local suppliers of intermediates will be worse off 
after the entry of multinationals if the technology gap between local and foreign producers of final goods is large.   6
privatization program was implemented. The privatization initiative together with the changes in 
the legislative framework and the incentives given for FDI provided new opportunities for 
foreign investors.  FDI became permitted in virtually all economic sectors, full ownership was 
allowed and there were no restrictions on profit repatriation. Foreign investors were offered 
guarantees against nationalization and expropriation as well as tax incentives including 
exemptions from customs duties, VAT exemptions for imports and tax holidays.  
As a result, FDI inflows in Romania, slow in the early 1990s, picked up rapidly after 
1996.  The amount of FDI received in 1998 was more than 20 times larger than that in 1993. The 
total volume of foreign direct investment during the period 1991-August 2001 totaled seven 
billion dollars.   The number of companies with foreign capital reached over 80 thousand by 
mid-August 2001, representing about 9 percent of all companies registered in Romania. In terms 
of the number of investment projects Italy ranked first, followed by Germany, China and Turkey. 
Preferred areas for FDI included oil exploration, automobile and automotive component 
industry, banking and finance, food processing, telecommunications and construction.  Romania 
is the fourth largest FDI recipients among Central and Eastern European countries but ranks 
tenth in the region in terms of FDI inflows per capita (see Table 1).  
 
Data Description 
The data used in this study come from a commercial database Amadeus compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information on companies operating in thirty-
five European countries, including Romania. The Amadeus database covers 387, 357 firms out 
of 783,969 (308,064 reported active) firms registered in Romania at the end of year 2000.
8 The 
difference comes from the fact that while Amadeus includes some inactive companies, it does 
not cover state owned firms or co-operatives.  Information on the firms included in Amadeus 
comes from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania. In addition to the standard 
financial statements, Amadeus includes detailed information about the ownership structure of 
firms which allows us to determine the foreign equity stake in each company.  Unfortunately, the 
database contains only the latest available ownership information (mostly for 2000 and 1999) 
                                                 
8 Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook (2001).   7
and no historical figures.
9  For this reason, we limit our analysis to an unbalanced panel spanning 
over the period 1998-2000.  We assume that firms which were foreign-owned in the year for 
which we have the ownership information were foreign-owned during the whole three-year 
period.   
The sample includes firms with more than five employees in 1999.  After deleting 
inactive firms and missing observations and removing outliers,
10 we are left with 54,032 firms 
(or 131,396 firm-year observations, between 42,246 and 52,240 observations per year).  For 
6,262 firms the foreign capital share exceeds ten percent of the total.    
We also employ the input-output matrix provided by the Statistical Institute of Romania 
for the first year covered by the sample 1998.
11  The input-output matrix contains 105 sectors 
and each firm in our dataset is matched with the IO sector classification based on its primary 
three-digit NACE code.  The concordances between the IO industry codes and three digits 
NACE codes are provided in Appendix Table A1.  All sectors of the economy are represented in 
our sample.  A detailed sectoral distribution of firms is presented in Table 2.   As summary 
statistics presented in Table 3 indicate, a large degree of heterogeneity is found in the case of 
outputs, inputs and ownership type. 
 
Empirical Strategy  
Model 
To examine the effect of foreign presence on productivity of domestic firms, we estimate 
a log-linear transformation of a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
ln Yit = α  + β1lnKit + β2lnLit + β3lnMit + β4Horizontal_Type1jt + β5Horizontal_Type2jt + 
+β7Vertical_Type1jt + β8Vertical_Type2jt + αt + αj + εijt     (1) 
 
                                                 
9 Despite this shortcoming many researchers studying European economies have employed the Amadeus data.  See, 
for instance, Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002), Castellani and Zanfei (2001), Konings and Murphy (2001), 
Konings, Rizov and Vandenbussche (2003), Schoors and van der Tol (2001). 
10 Firms in the top and bottom one percentile of all the firm-specific output and input variables were deleted from 
the sample. 
11  Ideally we would like to use multiple input-output matrices since relationships between sectors may change over 
the years or with FDI inflows, albeit radical changes are unlikely.  Unfortunately, input-output matrices for later 
years are not available.   8
where subscripts i, j and t refer to firm, industry and time, respectively. Yit stands for firm output. 
Kit, Lit and Mit represent production inputs: capital, labor, and materials. αt and αj capture time 
and industry effects, respectively.  We define output as firm’s turnover deflated by industry 
specific producer price indices at the two-digit NACE classification. We measure labor by the 
number of employees. Capital is proxied by the value of tangible fixed assets deflated using the 
GDP deflator.  Material inputs are deflated by a weighted average of the producer price indices 
of the supplying sectors. The weights are given by the input-output matrix and represent the 
proportion of inputs sourced from a given sector.   
In addition to the standard production function variables, we include measures of foreign 
presence in the same sector (Horizontal) as well as in downstream sectors (Vertical), which are 
defined as follows.  Horizontaljt is the share of an industry j’s output produced by firms with at 
least ten percent foreign equity, calculated for each of the 105 industries.  Even though the 
number of foreign firms does not change during the sample period, output fluctuates and thus it 
is a sector-specific time-varying variable. Since we are interested in exploring spillovers 
stemming from different types of FDI projects, we calculate separately measures of foreign 
presence pertaining to minority- and majority-owned foreign investments as well as to partially- 
and fully-owned foreign projects. 
  The variable Verticaljt is a proxy for the foreign presence in downstream sectors (i.e., 
sectors supplied by the industry to which the firm in question belongs) and thus is intended to 
capture the effect multinational customers have on domestic suppliers. It is defined in the 
following way: 
Verticaljt = Σk αjk Horizontalkt 
 
where αjk is the proportion of sector j’s output used by sector k taken from the 1998 input-output 
matrix including 105 sectors.
12 We calculate two separate measures of Vertical: one for partially- 
and one for fully-owned foreign projects by using the appropriate definition of Horizontal 
variables defined above.
13  For summary statistics on these and other variables see Table 3. 
 
                                                 
12 In calculating αjk sector j’s output sold for final consumption was excluded.  
13 Note that we do not calculate separate measures of Vertical for minority and majority foreign projects, as there is 
no theoretical argument suggesting that they should be different.    9
Estimation issues 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) estimate a version of the above equation on the sample of 
domestic firms using ordinary least squares correcting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.  
We will employ their estimation strategy and restrict our attention to domestic establishments.  
Considering only domestic firms has two advantages.  It allows us to focus on the impact of FDI 
on domestic firms and avoid a potential bias stemming from the fact that foreign investors tend 
to acquire stakes in large and most successful domestic companies (see Djankov and Hoekman, 
2000).  The regressions will include time and industry fixed effects.  The results from this 
specification are presented mainly for comparison purposes as they suffer from two econometric 
shortcomings. 
The first shortcoming of the above empirical strategy is that it does not take into account 
unobserved firm characteristics, such a managerial talent, availability of better infrastructure or 
access to financing, etc., which may affect firm productivity.  To address this issue we will 
reestimate our model as a panel with firm fixed effects.  It will allow us to control for time 
invariant determinants of productivity across firms that are also potentially correlated with FDI 
variables. 
The second shortcoming is the fact that the firm’s private knowledge of its productivity 
(unobserved by the econometrician) may affect the input decisions, leading to biased estimates of 
the coefficients on factor shares. Since our study relies on correctly measuring firm productivity, 
obtaining consistent estimates of the production function coefficients is crucial to our analysis.  
Some studies attempt to correct for the simultaneity bias by assuming that the unobserved firm 
heterogeneity can be captured by a time-invariant fixed effect or by using instrumental variables. 
However, both approaches rely on the simplifying assumptions of time-invariance of the firm-
specific effect in the former case and no serial correlation of the productivity shocks in the latter 
and are, therefore, not entirely satisfactory.   
For this reason, we employ the semi-parametric approach to estimating production 
function parameters suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2000). This method allows for firm-specific productivity differences that exhibit idiosyncratic 
changes over time and thus addresses the simultaneity bias.  To illustrate the insights of the 
method, we start with the following production function: 
   10
vait = yit - mit = α + βl *lit +βk *kit +ωit + ηit  (2) 
  
where va stands for value added (i.e., output minus material inputs), l labor, k capital, and i and t 
are subscripts denoting firm and time, respectively.  Capital is treated as a state variable while 
labor and materials are assumed to be freely variable inputs. ηit represents the error term 
capturing unpredictable shocks, while ωit is a productivity shock which is unobserved by the 
econometrician but known to the firm.  Firms adjust their variable inputs based on their 
anticipation or knowledge of the productivity component (ωit).  Since there exists a correlation 
between the error term (ωit + ηit) and the explanatory variables, a simple OLS procedure leads to 
inconsistent parameter estimates.  
As Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) showed, the unobserved productivity can be identified 
from the firms’ observable variable input choices. The chosen variable input is material inputs.
14 
The demand for materials can be modeled as a monotonic function of the capital stock and the 
unobserved (to the econometrician) productivity shock.   
 
mit = f(kit, ωit) 
 
The first advantage of using intermediate inputs is that they generally respond to the entire 
productivity term, while investment may respond only to the ‘news’ in the unobserved term.  
Further, intermediate inputs provide a simpler link between the estimation strategy and the 
economic theory, primarily because they are not typically state variables.  
Assuming the function f(.) is invertible, the unobservable productivity shock can be 
expressed as a function of observable variables  
 
ωit = h(mit ,kit)              (3) 
 
Note that we assume that materials are a variable input whose choice is affected by ωIt while 
capital is determined by past values of productivity only. 
                                                 
14 While Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment to model the unobserved productivity shock, we follow Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2000) approach and use materials as the instrument to correct for simultaneity bias (as was done by 
Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2001).  We do so because of the lack of reliable information on investment expenditures.   11
Substituting (3) into (2), we get the equation to be estimated in the first stage of the 
procedure: 
 
vait = α + βl *lit +βk *kit +  h(mit ,kit) + ηit  (4) 
 
Note that the functional form of h(.) is not known. Therefore, βk cannot be obtained at this stage.  
We estimate equation (4) using a third order polynomial expansion in capital and materials to 
approximate the unknown form of h(.).  From this stage we obtain the consistent estimate of the 
labor input coefficient as well as the estimate of the third order polynomial in mit and kit , to 
which we refer as ψit 
 
ψit= βk *kit +  h(mit ,kit) (5)  
 
Thus, h(mit ,kit)= ψit - βk *kit  (6) 
 
We proceed with the second stage where we estimate the effect of capital and materials on 
output.  Let’s consider the expectation of vat+1 - βl *lt+1 conditional on the information at time t. 
Assuming that ωit follows a first order Markov process, one can rewrite ωit+1 as a function of ωit, 
letting ξit+1 be the innovation in ωit+1.   And ωit can be replaced with a function of h(mit,kit). 
Therefore the equation to be estimated in the second stage becomes: 
 
vait+1 - βl *lit+1 =c + βk *kit+1 + g( hit(.)) + ξit+1 + ηit+1  (7) 
 
Since the functional for of g(.) is not known, we use once more the third order polynomial 
expansion (with all interactions). Since the capital in use in a given period is assumed to be 
known at the beginning of the period and ξit+1 is mean independent of all variables known at the 
beginning of the period, ξit+1 is mean independent of kit+1.  The consistent coefficient βk can thus 
be obtained by running non linear least squares on equation (7). 
In summary, following Olley and Pakes(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) we use a 
semi-parametric estimator to generate time-varying firm-specific measures of plant productivity 
that are consistent even in the presence of input shares being influenced by the private   12
knowledge of firm’s productivity.   The above procedure is performed for each sector separately 





We begin our analysis by examining the difference between horizontal spillovers 
associated with minority- and majority-owned foreign establishments.  Due to data constraints, 
we cannot include all the variables employed by Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) but we employ 
the same empirical strategy (OLS with White’s correction of standard errors).  The results, 
presented in the first column of Table 4, point to the presence of positive intra-industry 
spillovers, which are, however, significant only in the case majority-owned foreign projects.  We 
confirm Blomström and Sjöholm’s findings that there is no statistically significant difference in 
the magnitude of the coefficients associated with the two types of FDI. 
Since, as discussed earlier, there are reasons to expect a difference in spillovers stemming 
from partially- and wholly-owned foreign projects, we also estimate a model including a separate 
measure of horizontal spillovers associated with these two types of investment.  We find that 
only fully-owned foreign establishments result in positive and significant horizontal spillovers, 
and unlike in the previous case, this time the difference between the coefficients is statistically 
significant.  This is consistent with the view that multinationals transfer newer technologies and 
invest more resources in knowledge transfer to their fully-owned affiliates and thus such 
affiliates represent a greater potential for spillovers.
16   
Next we test whether the previously found positive effects associated with the majority-
owned foreign investments are driven by fully-owned foreign subsidiaries.  Thus we include 
three measures of Horizontal: minority (pertaining to firms with 10-50 percent of foreign share), 
majority-but-not-fully-owned (above 50 but less than 100 percent foreign ownership) and fully-
owned (100 percent foreign ownership).  Interestingly, we find that in a regression that includes 
all three measures the only positive and significant effect is associated with fully-owned foreign 
                                                 
15 Since the procedure described above calls for using lagged variables, we employ a longer panel 1996-2000 to 
obtain productivity estimates but in the subsequent analysis of spillovers the timeframe is restricted to years 1998-
2000.   
16 Additional regressions (not reported here) performed on a combined sample of both domestic and foreign indicate 
that fully-owned foreign subsidiaries have higher productivity levels than partially-owned foreign projects and 
domestic firms.   13
subsidiaries. The test of equality of coefficients reveals no significant difference between the 
minority and majority-but-not-fully-owned effects but a statistically significant difference 
between the impact of fully-owned projects and the other two types of FDI. 
 
Finally we focus on vertical spillovers from FDI by adding to our model two measures of 
foreign presence in downstream sectors.
17 While their inclusion has no effect on the coefficients 
of the Horizontal variables, we find that proxies for vertical spillovers exhibit a very different 
sign pattern.  Namely, partially-owned foreign projects appear to be associated with positive 
vertical spillovers while full foreign ownership results in negative externalities to domestic firms 
in upstream industries.  The two coefficients as well as the difference between them are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Their sign pattern is consistent with the 
hypothesis that foreign investors entering a host country through greenfield projects or full 
acquisitions are less likely to source their inputs locally than those who invested through joint 
ventures or partial acquisitions.
18  This may be due to the fact that the former group faces higher 
costs of finding local suppliers and that foreign owners tend to reduce the number of existing 




A serious drawback of the empirical strategy employed so far is its inability to account 
for unobserved firm characteristics that may influence firm productivity, such as managerial 
talent, quality of available infrastructure, etc.  To take them into account we exploit the panel 
nature of our dataset and estimate a model with firm specific fixed affects.  The findings are 
presented in Table 5.  The results pertaining to the impact of minority versus majority, as well as 
partial and full foreign ownership on productivity of domestic firms remain qualitatively 
unchanged thus lending support to our hypotheses. 
However, in the fixed effects specification we do find a statistically significant difference 
between horizontal spillovers associated with minority and majority foreign establishments. 
                                                 
17 Note that we include in the regression only the partially- and fully-owned measures of horizontal spillovers since 
we found no statistically significant difference between the spillover effects of minority and majority-but-not-fully-
owned projects.     
18 Greenfield investments accounted for about 50-60 percent of FDI inflows into Romania before 2002 (Voinea 
2003), which is the period covered by our sample. 
19 This point was, for instance, mentioned in “FDI-related policies in Hungary 1990-2001”, Investment for 
Development Project, Consumer Unit and Trust Society. Internet address: http://cuts.org/ifd-lm-cr-hun.doc    14
While the effects associated with minority ownership are insignificant, the spillovers stemming 
from majority owned are positive and statistically significant. These findings suggest that firm 
heterogeneity is important and accounting for it leads to more accurate estimates of spillovers 
effects associated with different degrees of foreign ownership. Nevertheless, when the majority 
variable is split into majority-but-not-fully-owned and fully-owned, the difference between the  
minority and majority- but-not -fully-owned becomes insignificant confirming the previous 
findings.  
 
The final robustness checks are presented in Table 6. We applied the Olley and Pakes 
(1996) method to estimate firm-specific total factor productivity and then used it as the 
dependent variable in an OLS estimation with industry fixed effects as well as in a first 
difference regression.
20  Moreover, we added the Herfindahl index to the model to control for 
industry concentration.
21  This additional control may be important, since as Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) pointed out, the estimates of spillover effect may capture the net impact of knowledge 
externalities and the competition effect.  The latter effect is present when foreign entry leads to 
increased competitive pressures which result in a decline of local firms’ market shares, 
increasing their average costs and thus lowering productivity.   
The results are broadly consistent with our previous findings.  First, we show that the 
share of foreign ownership matters for both horizontal and vertical spillovers.  In all regressions, 
the difference between spillovers associated with fully- and partially-owned foreign projects is 
statistically significant.  This is true for both inter- and intra-industry effects.   Second, as before 
the empirical evidence is consistent with positive spillovers from fully-owned foreign 
investments taking place within sectors.  The estimated coefficients are significant at the one 
percent level in all four regressions.  There is, however, some change with respect to horizontal 
spillovers associated with partially foreign-owned projects. While in the earlier regressions and 
in the OLS regression with the Olley-Pakes correction the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, the first difference results suggest that such projects have a negative and significant 
                                                 
20 Since the Olley-Pakes correction was applied to each industry separately, we had to discard industries with 
insufficient number of observations to carry out the procedure.  Hence, Table 6 contains regressions based on a 
smaller number of observations that the previous tables.   
21 The index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of the four largest producers in a given sector and its 
value ranges from 0 to 10000.  As pointed out by Nickell (1996), predictions of the theoretical literature on the 
impact of competition on productivity are ambiguous.  In the empirical analysis, however, he finds evidence of 
competition being positively correlated with a higher rate of productivity growth.   15
impact on the performance of domestic firms in their sector.  This would suggest that in the case 
of partially foreign-owned projects, the competition effect (which may not be entirely captured 
by the Herfindahl index) may outweigh knowledge externalities.  However, since this effect is 
not robust to other specifications, we stop short of drawing strong conclusions about it.  Third, as 
in the earlier regressions, the data suggests that there exist significant negative effects associated 
with the presence of fully foreign-owned projects in downstream sectors.  The evidence of a 
positive correlation between the presence of partially foreign-owned projects in downstream 
sectors and the productivity of domestic firms in upstream industries is, however, present only in 
the first difference regression.  In sum, the additional robustness checks lend support to our 
hypothesis that the degree of spillovers vary with the degree of foreign ownership. 
 
    
Conclusions 
Governments of developing countries often favor joint ventures over fully-owned FDI 
projects believing that active participation of local firms in foreign investment projects 
facilitates the absorption of new technologies and know-how.  In this paper, we leave aside the 
issue of whether this perception is true, and instead test if there is a difference in the magnitude 
of horizontal and vertical spillovers associated with different degrees of foreign ownership.  
We find evidence consistent with positive horizontal spillovers resulting from fully-owned 
foreign establishments but not from partially-owned foreign projects.  This finding is in line 
with the literature suggesting that foreign investors tend to put more resources into technology 
transfer to their wholly-owned projects than into joint ventures.   
A different pattern emerges in the case of vertical spillovers.  The data indicate that the 
presence of partially-owned foreign projects is correlated with higher productivity of domestic 
firms in upstream industries suggesting that domestic suppliers of intermediates may benefit 
from contacts with multinational customers.  The opposite is true, however, in the case of 
fully-owned foreign establishments which appear to have a negative effect on domestic firms 
in upstream sectors.  The latter finding is consistent with the observation that foreign investors 
entering a host country through greenfield projects are less likely to rely on local sourcing due 
to costs associated with finding domestic suppliers.  This result is also supported by the 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that after a full acquisitions of a domestic enterprise,   16
multinationals tend to reduce the number of suppliers often severing existing links with 
domestic firms in upstream sectors and thus lowering demand for domestically produced 
intermediates. 
While this study sheds some light on the factors driving FDI spillovers, certainly more 
work is needed to improve our understanding of this phenomenon.    17
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Table 1.  FDI Inflows into CEEC-10 1993-2000 
 
                      




   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000









Poland  1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 6,365 7,270 9,342  5.9  242  39,632  1,025
 
Czech  Republic  654  878 2,568 1,435 1,286 3,700 6,313 4,583  9.3  446  21,417  2,085
 
Hungary  2,350 1,144 4,519 2,274 2,167 2,037 1,977 1,692  3.7  169  18,159  1,812
 
Romania  94  341  419  263 1,215 2,031 1,041 1,025  2.8  46  6,429  287
 
Slovak Republic  199 270 236 351 174 562 354  2,052  10.7  380  4,198  777
 
Bulgaria  40 105  90 109 505 537 806  1,002  8.3  123  3,194  391
 
Latvia  45 214 180 382 521 357 348 407  5.7  169  2,454  1,015
 
Lithuania  30  31  73 152 355 926 486 379  3.4  102  2,432  658
 
Estonia  162 214 201 150 266 581 305 387  7.8  270  2,268  1,580
 
Slovenia  113 128 177 194 375 248 181 181  1.0  91  1,597  803
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (FDI figures) and World Bank World Development Indicators (GDP and population) 
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Table 2.  Distribution of Firms With Foreign Capital By Industry  
 
Industry code    Domestic 
Firms  Firms with Foreign Capital    Total 
      <10%   10<=FO<50   50<=FO<100  FO=100     
              
1   798  12  30  21   861 
3   94  2  2  1   99 
6   26  0  0  0   26 
8   543  10  27  26   606 
9   37  1  5  1   44 
13   673  7  11  5   696 
14   44  2  3  2   51 
15   14  1  1  0   16 
16   82  0  3  1   86 
18   646  20  28  26   720 
19   27  0  0  2   29 
20   134  4  10  11   159 
21   62  0  7  5   74 
22   298  9  11  7   325 
23   461  18  21  21   521 
24   18  1  2  3   24 
25   2164  49  150  116   2479 
26   343  17  27  23   410 
28   1807  45  139  213   2204 
29   87  4  3  7   101 
30   30  1  2  0   33 
31   379  6  50  90   525 
32   1183  31  104  91   1409 
33   138  12  25  13   188 
34   1010  46  68  45   1169 
36    7 0  1 3    11 
38   74  6  10  9   99 
40   59  3  7  3   72 
41   90  6  4  5   105 
42   54  3  8  17    82 
43   63  2  3  3   71 
44    3 1  0 0    4 
45   112  5  6  8   131 
46   274  21  34  40   369 
47   110  4  11  6   131 
48   57  3  5  5   70 
49    8 0  0 0    8 
50   90  0  8  5   103 
51   11  0  1  1   13 
52   98  5  4  4   111 
53   52  0  5  1   58 
54   14  0  5  2   21   21
55   13  0  2  5   20 
56    9 0  2 1    12 
57    9 1  1 1    12 
58   20  1  7  3   31 
59   65  1  3  5   74 
60   1014  24  49  53   1140 
61   41  2  7  3   53 
62   78  5  9  5   97 
63   21  0  6  1   28 
64   41  1  6  6   54 
65   67  1  12  7   87 
67   37  4  4  5   50 
68   98  8  13  15    134 
69   141  6  15  18   180 
70   54  11  6  10    81 
71   109  6  11  11   137 
72   89  5  8  4   106 
73   69  1  4  2   76 
74   17  0  1  0   18 
77   551  18  49  40   658 
78   191  3  19  21   234 
79   18  0  2  0   20 
80    4 0  3 1    8 
81   43  1  1  1   46 
82   71  0  0  0   71 
83   4193  60  86  54   4393 
84   19900  385  904  887   22076 
85   321  8  20  13   362 
86   2065  26  73  46   2210 
87    8 1  2 2    13 
88   1528  40  111  117   1796 
90   30  1  4  2   37 
91    9 1  0 1    11 
92   113  7  8  13   141 
93   275  9  24  28   336 
95   234  11  16  17   278 
97   214  7  19  11   251 
98   376  20  49  54   499 
99   78  2  2  4   86 
100   541  18  30  16   605 
101   1150  38  91  100   1379 
102   13  0  1  0   14 
103   142  3  1  4   150 
104   208  3  21  10   242 
105   1228  26  100  58   1412 
Total   47770  1122  2643  2497    54032 
FO stands for share of foreign capital in total firm’s equity.  Industry codes correspond to sector codes  
used in the input-output matrix.  See Table 1A – Appendix for a concordance with NACE classification. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Nr.  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Sales (th. Lei 1995)  131,396  7,113.6  11,498.8  17.8  208,280.0 
Fixed assets (th. Lei 1995)  131,396  1,399.9  3,757.3  0.004  56,666.2 
Materials (th. Lei 1995)  131,396  5,265.0  9,042.1  8.4  102,814.1 
Number of Employees   131,396  20.4  37.1  2.0  410.0 
         
Horizontal minority   131,396  0.033  0.02  0  0.29 
Horizontal majority  131,396  0.146  0.07  0  0.88 
Horizontal partially-owned  131,396  0.107  0.04  0  0.81 
Horizontal majority-  but not fully-owned  131,396  0.740  0.03  0  0.80 
Horizontal fully-owned  131,396  0.072  0.05  0  0.67 
         
Vertical partially-owned  131,396  0.062  0.04  0  0.70 
Vertical fully-owned  131,396  0.040  0.02  0  0.21 
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Table 4. OLS Regressions Results 
 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Horizontal minority foreign owned [10,50]  -0.0312    -0.0146  
  (0.1876)    (0.1882)  
Horizontal majority foreign owned (50,100]  0.2924***       
 (0.0869)       
Horizontal partially-owned [10,100)   0.0341   0.0719 
   (0.1002)   (0.1008) 
Horizontal majority (excluding fully owned) (50,100)     0.0577   
      (0.1268)  
Horizontal fully-owned [100]    0.4442*** 0.4436***  0.4666*** 
    (0.1083) (0.1082)  (0.1092) 
       
Vertical partially-owned      0.5272*** 
      (0.1360) 
Vertical fully-owned      -1.2670*** 
       (0.1796) 
        
Ln fixed assets  0.0633***  0.0633***  0.0633***  0.0633*** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Ln materials  0.7102***  0.7102***  0.7102***  0.7104*** 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Ln labor  0.2436***  0.2436***  0.2436***  0.2433*** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0024) 
        
Constant 1.4789***  1.4873***  1.4871***  1.5173*** 
 (0.0158)  (0.0160)  (0.016)  (0.0223) 
        
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Adj. R squared  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89 
No. of observations  131,396  131,396  131,396  131,396 
        
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  2.39  0.71  0.09  8.07 
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.123  0.003  0.76  0.0045 
     (min  vs.  maj)   
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal      6.05  
Prob. > F test Horizontal      0.014  
      (maj vs fully)   







Prob. > F test Vertical       0.000 
The dependent variable is firm output.  Standard errors are listed in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote 
significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively.   24
Table 5. Fixed Effects Regressions Results 
 
   Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Horizontal minority foreign owned [10,50]  -0.0745   -0.0534   
  (0.0923)   (0.0809)   
Horizontal majority foreign owned (50,100]  0.1965***      
 (0.0419)      
Horizontal partially-owned [10,100)   -0.0677    -0.0226 
   (0.0530)    (0.0534) 
Horizontal majority (excluding fully owned) (50,100)     -0.0745   
     (0.0552)   
Horizontal fully-owned [100]    0.3710*** 0.3712***  0.4014*** 
    (0.0498) (0.0442)  (0.0502) 
Vertical partially-owned       0.6414*** 
       (0.0887) 
Vertical fully-owned       -1.2592*** 
      
       (0.0968) 
        
Ln fixed assets  0.0377***  0.0376***  0.0376***  0.0372*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0012)  (0.0015) 
Ln materials  0.7456***  0.7457***  0.7457***  0.7465*** 
 (0.0034)  (0.0034)  (0.0016)  (0.0034) 
Ln labor  0.1702***  0.1700***  0.1700***  0.1677*** 
 (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0024)  (0.0039) 
        
Constant 1.7548***  1.7630***  1.7630***  1.7646*** 
 (0.0230)  (0.0231)  (0.0127)  (0.0246) 
        
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firms specific dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Adj. R squared  0.86  0.86  0.87  0.89 
No. of observations  131,396  131,396  131,396  131,396 
        
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  9.48 48.88  0.05  49.9 
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.002 0.000  0.832  0.000 
     (min  vs.  maj)   
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal        





  0.000  
       (maj vs fully)   
F test for equal coefficients on Vertical        478.77 
Prob. > F test Vertical        0.000 
The dependent variable is firm output.  Standard errors are listed in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance 
at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively.   25
Table 6 : Olley and Pakes Regressions Results 
 




        
Horizontal partially-owned -0.094  -0.12  -0.290** -0.329** 
 (0.202)  (0.202)  (0.126) (0.126) 
Horizontal fully-owned  1.191*** 1.281***  1.057***  1.045*** 
  (0.2) (0.201)  (0.134)  (0.132) 
Vertical partially-owned  -0.055  -0.032  1.006*** 0.967*** 
 (0.399)  (0.399)  (0.285) (0.286) 
Vertical fully-owned  -1.621*** -1.664***  -1.191***  -1.237*** 
  (0.39) (0.391)  (0.236) (0.237) 
        
Concentration measure    <0.001***    <0.001*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
        
Constant 2.891***  2.894***  -0.069***  -0.071*** 
 (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
        
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
        
Adj. R squared  0.30  0.30  0.003  0.003 
No. of observations  117,877  117,877  71,641  71,641 
        
F test for equal coefficients on 
Horizontal  20.99 24.53  63.55  66.87 
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
        
F test for equal coefficients on 
Vertical  8.69 9.40  38.90  38.91 
Prob. > F test Vertical  0.003 0.000  0.000  0.000 
        
The dependent variable is firm productivity calculated for each industry separately using 
the Olley-Pakes procedure.  Standard errors are listed in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote 






   26
Appendix 
 
Table 1A. Concordances Table 
    
IO codes  Industry name  NACE 
    
1  Vegetable production  01.1  ; 01.3 
2  Animal breeding  01.2 ; 01.3 
3  Auxiliary services  1.4 
4  Forestry and hunting  02.0 ; 01.5 
5  Logging  2 
6  Fishing and aquaculture  5 
7  Coal mining and processing   10 
8  Extraction of petroleum (including auxiliary services)  11.1 ; 11.2 
9  Extraction of natural gas (including auxiliary services)  11.1 ; 11.2 
10  Radioactive ores quarrying  and processing  12 
11  Ferrous ores quarrying  and processing  13.1 
12  Non-ferrous ores quarrying  and processing  13.2 
13  Extraction of building material ores  14.1 
14  Extraction of clay and sand  14.2 
15  Extraction and processing of chemical ores  14.3 
16  Extraction and processing of salt  14.4 
17  Other non-ferrous ores quarrying  and processing  14.5 
18  Meat  production and processing  15.1 
19  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products  15.2 
20  Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables  15.3 
21  Production of vegetable and animal oil and fat  15.4 
22  Production of milk products  15.5 
23  Production of milling products, starch and starch products  15.6 
24  Manufacture of fodder  15.7 
25  Processing of other food products  15.8 
26  Beverages  15.9 
27  Tobacco products  16 
28  Textile industry  17 
29  Apparel and clothing  18.1 ; 18.2 
30  Manufacture of leather and fur clothes  18.3 
31  Footwear and other leather goods  19 
32  Wood processing (excluding furniture)  20 
33  Pulp, paper and cardboard; related items  21 
34  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  22 
35  Coking  23.1 
36  Crude oil processing  23.2 
37  Processing of nuclear combustibles  23.3 
38  Basic chemical products  24.1 
39  Pesticides and other agrochemical products  24.2 
40  Dyes and varnishes  24.3 
41  Medicines and pharmaceutical products  24.4 
42  Soaps, detergents, cosmetics, perfumery  24.5   27
43  Other chemical products  24.6 
44  Synthetic and man made fibres  24.7 
45  Rubber processing  25.1 
46  Plastic processing  25.2 
47  Glass and glassware  26.1 
48  Processing of refractory ceramics (excluding building items) 26.2 
49  Ceramic boards   26.3 
50  Brick, tile and other building material processing  26.4 
51  Cement, lime and plaster  26.5 
52  Processing of concrete, cement and lime items  26.6 
53  Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  26.7 
54  Other non-metallic mineral products  26.8 
55  Metallurgy and ferroalloys processing  27.1 
56  Manufacture of tubes  27.2 
57  Other metallurgy products  27.3 
58  Precious metals and other non-ferrous metals  27.4 
59  Foundry  27.5 
60  Metal structures and products  28 
61 
Manufacture of equipment for producing and using of 
mechanical power (except  for plane engines, vehicles and 
motorcycles)  29.1 
62  Machinery for general use  29.2 
63  Agricultural  and forestry machinery  29.3 
64  Machine tools  29.4 
65  Other machines for special use  29.5 
66  Armament and  ammunition  29.6 
67  Labor-saving devices and domestic machinery  29.7 
68  Computers and office machinery  30 
69  Electric machinery and appliances  31 
70  Radio, TV-sets and communication  equipment   32 
71  Medical, precision, optical instruments and apparatus  33 
72  Means of road transport  34 
73  Naval engineering and repair  35.1 
74  Production and repair of railway transport means   35.2 
75  Aircraft engineering and repair  35.3 
76  Motorcycles , bicycles and other transport means   35.4 ; 35.5 
77  Furniture  36.1 
78  Other industrial activities  36.2 - 36.6 
79  Electric power production and distribution  40.1 
80  Gas production and distribution  40.2 
81  Production and distribution of thermal energy  40.3 
82  Water collection, treatment and distribution  41 
83  Construction  45 
84  Wholesale and retail  50 - 52 
85  Hotels  55.1 ; 55.2 
86  Restaurants  55.3 - 55.5 
87  Railway transport  60.1 
88  Road transport  60.2   28
89  Pipe-line transport  60.3 
90  Water transport  61 
91  Air transport  62 
92  Auxiliary transport activities and travel agencies  63.1 ; 63.2 
93  Tourism agencies and assistance  63.3 
94  Post and mail  64.1 
95  Telecommunication  64.2 
96  Financial, banking and insurance services  65 - 67 
97  Real estate activities  70 
98  Computer and related activities  72 
99  Research and development  73 
100  Architecture, engineering and other technical services  74.2 
101  Other business activities  71 ; 74.1 ; 74.3 - 
74.8 
102  Public administration and defense, social assistance  75 
103  Education  80 
104  Health and social work  85 
105  Other services (collective, social and personal services)  90 - 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 